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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Derek Jon Sanders appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his petition

for post-conviction relief.

Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings

Statement

The Idaho Court of Appeals described

the facts underlying Sanders’ criminal convictions

as follows:

Derek Jon Sanders was found

guilty of criminal possession of a ﬁnancial

Code

§ 18-3 125; grand theft, LC. § 18-24030), 18-24070);
and With being a persistent Violator, I.C. 19-2514. The district court imposed

transaction card, Idaho

concurrent, uniﬁed sentences 0f ﬁve years, with a

minimum period of conﬁnement

of three years, for criminal possession 0f a ﬁnancial transaction card and twelve
minimum period 0f conﬁnement 0f four years, for grand theft.

years, with a

State V. Sanders,

2018

WL

3828152

at

1

(Ct.

App., Aug. 13, 2018) (unpublished).

Court of Appeals afﬁrmed Sanders’ judgment 0f conviction and sentences.
Sanders ﬁled a pro se petition for post-conviction

relief,

The Idaho

(Id., p.2.)

claiming that his

trial

counsel,

Rilie Fry (a public defender), provided ineffective assistance because he labored under a conﬂict

had a conﬂict

0f interest.

(R., pp.5-8.) In his petition,

0f

because Sanders’ prior attorney, Dave Martinez (employed by the same public

interest

Sanders alleged his

trial

counsel, Rilie Fry,

defender’s ofﬁce as Mr. Fry), had Withdrawn from representing Sanders due t0 a conﬂict.

The

state

ﬁled an answer and a motion for summary dismissal.

Sanders was appointed counsel (R., pp.10-1

Motion

for

Summary Dismissal,”

1),

(R., pp.12-14, 26-27.)

I

After

he ﬁled an “Amended Afﬁdavit in Objection t0

explaining in relevant part:

was told early in the case, 0f my criminal case for Possession 0f an FTC
and Grand Theft, case N0. CR-2016-6216-FE, by Randy Schulthies that if did not
want any delays in my case or continuance of the trial I would need t0 sign a letter
saying I was OK with Dave Martinez taking the case from Randy because he was
2.

(Id.)

would not bring any “ineffective assistance 0f counsel” complaints.
I agreed With Dave doing the trial in my case and then they changed again. I did
agree t0 Riley [sic] Fry When my attorney Dave Martinez told me he could not
represent me because he had a conﬂict and represented a person who was an
important Witness in my case. I was assigned another attorney from his ﬁrm, the
Public Defender’s ofﬁce and when Rylie [sic] was substituted in I thought that
would be 0k because Dave and Randy said their ofﬁce would be prepared and he
would d0 a good job.
too busy and

I

informed Riley [sic] Fry of the name and person who was a witness in my
case, and that was Why Dave had not been able to work With me. Rylie [sic] said it
would “not be a problem” and he would be able to call any witnesses we needed in
I

my case.

Randy and Riley [sic] that Pia Adamson was a
Witness as she was in Fred Meyer with me While I used the FTC and knew I had
permission to use it. Dave Martinez also represented Pia and this was another
conﬂict. She would also be a Witness When I gave Katie Denney (Victim) her card
case and cards back t0 her after using them. She was never called as a Witness at
trial. Rylie [sic] knew that Pia was a witness but we never discussed calling her.
Dave said he as the public defender represented each 0f these Witnesses.
4.

I

discussed With Dave,

(R., pp.42-44.)

After a change of attorneys
State’s

Motion

for

(E

Summary Dismissal

R., pp.30-35), Sanders’ counsel

(R., pp.36-40).

The

district court

ﬁled an Objection t0

subsequently entered an

Order Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (R., pp.49-80) and a judgment
Sanders ﬁled a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.83-87.)

(R., pp.81-82).

ISSUE
Sanders states the issue 0n appeal

Did

as:

the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Sanders’ petition for post-

conviction relief?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)

The

state rephrases the issue

Has Sanders

failed t0

for post-conviction relief?

show

on appeal

as:

error in the district court’s

summary

dismissal of his petition

ARGUMENT
Sanders Has Failed T0

Show Error

In

The

That His Trial Counsel
A.

Summary Dismissal Of His Claim
Conﬂict Of Interest

District Court’s

Had An Actual

Introduction

Sanders contends the

district court erred

that his trial counsel represented

him.

by summarily dismissing his

him while having an

(E generally Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-9.)

post—conviction claim

actual conﬂict of interest that prejudiced

Sanders alleges his

trial

counsel, Rilie Fry, had

two conﬂicts of interest imputed to him by co-public defender Dave Martinez, Who had represented
(1)

an “important witness” in Sanders’ case} and

argument

fails

a

summary

fact.

dismissal

is

Workman V.

Sanders’

to support his claim.

appropriate Where the petitioner’s evidence raises n0 genuine issue

State,

144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007).

On review of

dismissal of a post-conviction petition, “this Court Will determine Whether a genuine

issue of fact exists based

0n ﬁle and

(Id.)

Of Review

Summary
ofmaterial

woman named Pia Adamson.

because he did not present a genuine issue of material fact

Standard

B.

(2) a

on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together With any afﬁdavits

will liberally construe the facts

and reasonable inferences in favor 0f the non-moving

party.” La. at 523, 164 P.3d at 803.

1

On

appeal, Sanders states that Martinez “told

conﬂict 0f interest, as he represented
case.”’

(Appellant’s Brief, p.2.)

represent him because of a
‘Was an important Witness in my

him he could not

Roman Hamman, Who

However, Sanders’

district court

pleadings and supporting

(m

documents did not identify Who
R., pp.5-9 (original petition),
pp.36-40 (Objection to State’s Motion), pp.42-48 (Amended Afﬁdavit in Objection).) Although
Sanders’ amended afﬁdavit referred t0 Martinez’s representation of Pia Adamson as “another
the “important Witness” was.

conﬂict” (R., p.45, 1T4), that statement does not establish that Hamman was the “important witness”
involved in the ﬁrst conﬂict. The district court’s order denying Sanders post-conviction relief also
did not identify

Hamman

pp.49-80.) Regardless of

as the “important witness” referenced in Sanders’ pleadings.

Who

(E R.,

the “important Witness” was, Sanders failed t0 present a genuine

issue 0f material fact t0 support his claim.

w
The

18 in

Show

Sanders Has Failed To

C.

its

district court’s ruling

Error In The District Court’s

Summary

0n Sanders’ “actual conﬂict” claim,

and relied upon by the

state t0

Of His

pages

through

set forth at

1

is

attached as Appendix

show

that the district court

Order Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (R., pp.49-66),

A and incorporated by this reference

Dismissal

correctly held that Sanders failed t0 (1) “connect his counsel’s perceived shortcomings to the

alleged conﬂict of interest stemming from another public defender’s concurrent representation 0f

a Witness the Petitioner believed

was important

to his case[,]”

and

(2)

“demonstrate that an actual

conﬂict of interest existed due to Mr. Martinez’s alleged representation 0f ‘an important witness’
in the Petitioner’s case.” (R., p.65.)

Although the

district court’s

order did not speciﬁcally address Sanders’ assertion that Mr.

Fry also had a conﬂict 0f interest due

summary dismissal 0f Sanders’
claim.

t0 Mr. Martinez’s representation

post-conviction petition necessarily included that part of Sanders’

(E R., pp.79, 81); ﬂ Crow

2016) (“[T]the

V. State,

160 Idaho 201, 209, 370 P.3d 404, 412

district court implicitly ruled that

would not have been

of Pia Adamson, the court’s

successful.);

Crow’s motion

t0 testify at the I.C.R.

Herman ex rel. Herman V. Herman, 136 Idaho

209, 214 (2002) (“In unconditionally granting defendant’s motion for
district court implicitly

ruled against Matthew’s argument

.

.

.

.”).

(Ct.

App.

35 hearing

781, 786, 41 P.3d

summary judgment,

Because the

district court

the

denied

Sanders’ claim Without any condition, the court concluded, Without expressly stating, that Sanders
failed to present a genuine issue

0f material

fact in support

of his claim that Mr. Fry had an actual

conﬂict of interest due t0 Mr. Martinez’s representation 0f Pia Adamson.

The

state

makes

the

following supplemental arguments in that regard.

The

district court’s

Order Denying Petition for Post—Conviction

relief accurately sets forth

the legal standards applicable t0 post-conviction proceedings, ineffective assistance of counsel

how such claims

are applied

when they

involve concurrent representation by attorneys in the same public defender’s ofﬁce.

(E R.,

claims, and “actual conﬂict 0f interest” claims

pp.51-62.) In short, in State

Supreme Court embraced

V.

--

including

Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 707, 215 P.3d 414, 427 (2009), the Idaho

the Idaho Court

oprpeals

decision in State

V.

Cook, 144 Idaho 784,

171 P.3d 1282 (Ct. App. 2007), concluding:
In Cook, the court

drew a

distinction

between private law ﬁrms and public

defender’s ofﬁces and declined t0 impute one public defender’s conﬂict t0 the
entire ofﬁce. Id. at 794, 171 P.3d at 1292. In its decision, the court refused t0 adopt

a per se rule regarding the treatment 0f public defender’s ofﬁces under the Rules.
Id.

Instead,

it

decided that

it

was

preferable to analyze Whether one public

defender’s conﬂict should be imputed to the entire ofﬁce on a case-by—case basis.
Id.

Under

this

approach, the relevant inquiry

is

“Whether

‘the circumstances

demonstrate a potential conﬂict of interest and a signiﬁcant likelihood 0f
Bell, 90 N.J. 163, 447
“‘both
an actual conﬂict
a presumption that

prejudice.’” Id. at 793, 171 P.3d at 1291 (quoting State

A.2d 525, 529

(1982)).

If so, there is

0f interest and actual prejudice Will

arise.’” Id.

.

.

v.

.

For these reasons, we hold that the framework set forth by the Court 0f
Appeals in Cook is the appropriate standard for analyzing conﬂicts within public
.

.

.

defender’s ofﬁces.

The Severson decision

further explained:

To determine whether an

actual conﬂict of interest exists, Idaho Courts look to the

standards set forth in the Idaho Rules 0f Professional Conduct. See,

e.g.,

State

v.

Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 98, 967 P.2d 702, 712 (1998). Rule
interest and, in

1.7 addresses conﬂicts of
2004, provided that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the

representation involves a concurrent conﬂict of interest.” Idaho R. Prof. Conduct

A concurrent conﬂict 0f interest exists When “the representation of one client
be directly adverse to another client” 0r when “there is a signiﬁcant risk that
the representation of one 0r more clients Will be materially limited by the lawyers
responsibilities to another client, a former client 0r a third person or by the personal
interests of the lawyer.” Id.
1.7.

will

Severson, 147 Idaho

The record
interest related t0

at

705, 215 P.3d at 425 (emphases added).

reveals that Sanders failed t0

meet

his

burden 0f alleging an actual conﬂict of

Mr. Martinez’s representation of Pia Adamson (imputed

to

Mr. Fry), much

less

that

Sanders’ claim

either

is

that

none of his pleadings establish

that the representation

Mr. Martinez or Mr. Fry was “directly adverse”

how the

to Sanders.

of Pia

ﬂaw

fatal

0f

Adamson by

Sanders also failed t0 show

concurrent representation would have created “a signiﬁcant risk that the representation of

one 0r more
[or]

The

Mr. Fry’s performance was adversely affected by such alleged conﬂict.

clients

[would have] materially limited the lawyers responsibilities

t0 another client,

a former client[.]” Id.

Sanders’ ﬁrst mentioned Pia

Adamson

in his

Amended Afﬁdavit of Petitioner, where he

stated:

Randy and Riley [sic] that Pia Adamson was a
Witness as she was in Fred Meyer With me While I used the FTC and knew I had
permission t0 use it. Dave Martinez also represented Pia and this was another
conﬂict. She would also be a witness when I gave Katie Denny (victim) her card
case and cards back t0 her after using them. She was never called as a witness at
trial. Rylie [sic] knew that Pia was a witness but we never discussed calling her.
Dave said he as the public defender represented each 0f these Witnesses.
4.

(R.,

I

discussed With Dave,

p.45 (emphases added).) Sanders also averted in his

was interviewed by

Amended Afﬁdavit

the police, and that he “believe[d] Pia

would help

that Pia

Adamson

[his] story that

we had

permission to buy any items and gave the card back t0 the owner, Katie.” (R., p.46.)

According to Sanders, Pia Adamson was not “adverse”
she

was going

t0 help his case

card and he returned

it

t0 the

by testifying

that

was

—

to the contrary,

he had permission t0 use the ﬁnancial transaction

owner (Katie Denny)

Ms. Adamson’s anticipated testimony

2

that

to his case at all

after

he used

it.

Sanders alleged nothing about

either directly adverse to

him

or that

would have

Sanders also said in his Amended Afﬁdavit, “[t]here was also a relationship between
Adamson and Laura Wilson, Who called police on Pia and me. I discussed With [attorneys] t0

Pia
call

Laura Wilson as a Witness to show her motives in calling police and the errors in the police report
involving the allegations about me ﬂeeing from police and evading them in my car.” This
reference to Pia Adamson is the only other mention (except as stated above) 0f her name in
Sanders’ pleadings and supporting documents.

materially limited the

way

adequately allege that his

in

which

trial

his counsel represented him.

Moreover, having failed to

counsel had an imputed concurrent actual conﬂict of interest,

Sanders cannot show that such (non-existent) conﬂict carried a signiﬁcant likelihood of prejudice.

g

Severson, 147 Idaho at 705, 215 P.3d at 425

Sanders has failed to show any error in the

district court’s

summary dismissal of his

post-

conviction petition and his conﬂict of interest claim.

CONCLUSION
The

Court afﬁrm the

state respectfully requests that this

dismissing Sanders’ petition for post—conviction

district court’s

order summarily

relief.

DATED this 23rd day of September, 2019.

/s/

John C. McKinney

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

IN

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFTHE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

DEREK JON SANDERS,

)

Case No. CV-2017-2837-PC

)

Petitioner,

)

)
)

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,

W
)

Order Denying

)

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

)
)

Respondent.

)
)

This

is

a post-conviction case alleging ineﬁ‘ective assistance of counsel. The

Derek Jon Sanders, raised a number of claims regarding

petitioner,

his attorney’s inadequate performance,

including failure to communicate and prepare, conﬂict of interest, and inadequate knowledge of
the case resulting in incompetent representation at trial and leading to the Petitioner’s

conviction.‘

The

Petitioner is seeking “a

represent [him] adequately during the

new trial” and the appointment of an “attorney that will

trial

proceedings.”2

After consideration 0f the Petitioner’s arguments and having reviewed the Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief, the State’s response, and the Petitioner’s reply brief and amended
affidavit, the Petition for

1

2

See

Post-Conviction Relief is denied.

Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief, 1-2, July 18, 2017.

1d. at 3.

Page 1

ORDER DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
V

Sanders v. State
Case No. CV-2017-2837-PC

Page 49

PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
In the underlying criminal case, the Petitioner

was initially charged with two counts of

criminal possession of a ﬁnancial card in violation of Idaho

Code (“1C”)

§ 18—3 125

and one

count of grand theﬁ in violation of IC §§ 18—24030) and 2407(1). The Petitioner was
additionally charged with being a persistent violator under IC
§ 19-2514. Eventually, one count

of criminal possession of a ﬁnancial card was dismissed. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and
the jury found the Petitioner guilty of all charges

on

May 3, 2017. At the

sentencing healing on

July l7, 2017, the court sentenced the Petitioner to a prison term ofthree years ﬁxed, two years
indeterminate on the possession of a ﬁnancial card charge and four years ﬁxed, eight years
indeterminate on the grand theﬁ charge.3

The

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was ﬁled the

next day, 0n July 18, 201 7. The Petitioner also ﬁled an appeal of the underlying criminal case 0n

August

4,

2017. Thereafter, the court granted the Petitioner’s request for the appointment of

counsel to assist

him

in pursuing his post—conviction claims,

and Robert 0. Eldredge,

Jr.

was

assigned to the case. Thereaﬁer, Mr. Eldredge submitted a Motion to Withdraw as counsel based

on a previously unknown conﬂict of interest. That motion was uncontested, and the court
appointed R. Brad Willis as

The

State ﬁled

an Answer

Summary Dismissal with
State’s

Motion

for

new counsel

for the Petitioner.

to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and

supporting brief.

a Motion for

The Petitioner followed up with an Objection to

Summary Dismissal and an Amended Afﬁdavit in Objection to Motion for

Summary Dismissal. The Petitioner has also requested “90 days to submit discovery to the
3

See

state

id. at 1.

ORDER DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Sanders

v.

Page 2

State

Case No. CV-20 1 7-283 7-PC

Page 50

and conduct further investigation to ensure

that all possible claims are raised in this ﬁrst

Petition?“

I_S_sy_§

l.

Is the Petitioner entitled to post—conviction relief based

on the

ineffective assistance

of

counsel?

DISCUSSION

As

explained, the basis of the Petition for Post—Conviction Relief is the alleged

ineffective assistance

prepare,

of counsel, including claims

had inadequate knowledge of the

Motion for Summary Dismissal, the
of counsel

“fail to raise

resulting prejudice.

”6

case,

that counsel failed to

communicate and

and allegations of a conﬂict of interests In the

State argued the Petitioner’s claims of ineﬁective assistance

a genuine issue of material fact regarding both deﬁcient performance and

The

State also argued the “other claims” are subject to dismissal because

those allegations “are bare, conclusory, unsubstantiated by fact, procedurally defaulted, or
clearly disproven

a.

by the record?”

Legal Standards for Post—Conviction Relief

A petition for post-conviction relief is governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act (“UPCPA”), Idaho Code §§ 19-4901
proceeding that

4
5

6

is civil

Obj. to State’s Mot. for

See

in nature, “entirely

Summ.

—

19-491 1. Such a petition

initiates

a

new and independent from the criminal action which

Dismissal, 3, Dec. 4, 2017.

Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 1—2.

Resp’t’s Mot. for

Summ.

Dismissal,

l,

Aug.

l7,

2017.

7

Id.

ORDER DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Page 3

Sanders v. State
Case No. CV—2017—2837-PC

Page 51

led to the conviction.”8

crime” and

§ 19-4901(a),

a “person

who claims the conviction or sentence was

who is convicted of or sentenced for a

illegal

within the parameters of that

may initiate a post-conviction proceeding. Examples of post—conviction claims covered

statute,

by the

Under IC

statute include the assertion that the conviction or sentence violated the federal or state

constitutions or the laws of Idaho, or “there exists evidence of material facts, not previously

presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest ofjustice.
3’9
.

.

Ineffective assistance of counsel is an allowable claim under the

petition for post-conviction relief is not

UPCPA.”

a substitute for appeal“; therefore, the

However, a

UPCPA bars any

claim that could have been raised on a direct appeal but was not raised, unless such claim was
not

known

or could not have reasonably been

known at the time of the appeal.”

petition for post-conviction relief may not re-litigate

appeal.

Similarly, a

any issue already presented on a direct

l3

Idaho Code § 19.4902(a)” establishes the time limits for the ﬁling of a petition for postconviction

8

relief,

requiring that “[a]n application

may be ﬁled at any time within one (1) year

v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 430, 835 p.2d 661, 665 (Idaho Ct.App. 1992); Stare
69 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Idaho Ct.App. 2003).
9
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4901(a)(2017).
1°
Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 477, 224 P.3d 536, 544 (Idaho Ct.App. 2009).
“
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4901(b)(2017).
‘2
Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 603, 21 P.3d 924, 925 (2001).
‘3
Gizpimebb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 737, 792 (2002).

Nellsch

v.

LePage, 138 Idaho 803,

806,

l4

19—4902.
(a)

Commencement of proceedings—-VeriﬁcationuFilinguService—DNA

testing

A proceeding is commenced by ﬁling an application veriﬁed by the applicant with the clerk ofthe district court

in which the conviction took place. An application may be ﬁled at any time within one (1) year ﬁ'om the expiration
of the time for appeal or ﬁ'om the determination of an appeal or ﬁ'om the determination of a proceeding following an
appeal, whichever is later. Facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant and the authenticity of all
documents and exhibits included in or attached to the a - lication must be sworn to aﬂirmativel as mle and correct.

ORDERDNYIN

OCNVIICTON

REle
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ﬁ'om the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination
of an appeal or from the
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever
also requires that “[ﬂacts within the personal

all

documents and exhibits included

afﬁrmatively as true and correc

requested,

all

knowledge of the applicant and the authenticity of

in or attached to the application

must be sworn t0

l5

demands

that

a petitioner

state

grounds upon which the application

and identify in the application
is

based, the speciﬁc relief

previous proceedings in the case, and the facts that are within the personal

knowledge of the

petitioner.

That section further requires a petitioner to attach afﬁdavits,

records, or other evidence supporting the allegations, or the petitioner

evidence

is

That section of the code

.”

In addition, IC § 19-4903
for post-conviction relief the

is later.”

missing from the application. “Like a plaintiff in a

must recite why such

civil action, the applicant

must

prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post—conviction
relief is

based?“ However, unlike a complaint

conviction relief must contain

more

in

an ordinary

facts than the “short

civil action,

a petition for post-

and plain statement of the claim” that

is

The supreme court may prescribe the form ofthe application and veriﬁcation. The clerk shall docket the application
ugon its receipt and promptly bring it to the attention of the com and deliver a copy to the prosecuting attorney.
1

§ 19—4903. Application-Contents

The

application shall identify the proceedings in which the applicant

judgment and sentence complained

of,

was convicted, give the date of the entry of the
upon which the application is based, and

speciﬁcally set forth the grounds

clearly state the relief desired. Facts within the personal

knowledge of the applicant

shall

be

set forth separately

ﬁom

other allegations of facts and shall be veriﬁed as provided in section 19-4902. Afﬁdavits, records, or other evidence

be attached to the application or the application shall recite why they are not attached
previous proceedings, together with the grounds therein asserted, taken by the
applicant to secure relief from his conviction or sentence. Argument, citations, and discussion of authorities are
supporting

The

its

allegations shall

application shall identify

all

unnecessary.
‘6

Goodwin

v.

State,

138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 Idaho Ct.
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required of the usual complaint under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.” Instead, the
application “must be veriﬁed with respect to the facts within the personal

knowledge of the

applicant” through aﬁidavits, records, or other evidence to support the allegations therein.”
If

an application does not include such admissible evidence, “the application shall be subj ect to

dismissal?”

Under

section 19-4906(b), if a court

petitioner is not entitled to relief and

court

may “indicate to the parties

its

is

satisﬁed, based

on

the entire record, that the

no purpose would be served by any
intention t0 dismiss the application

further proceedings, the

and

its

reasons for so

doing.”2° In such cases, the petitioner “shall be given an opportunity to reply within 20
days to
the proposed dismissal”, after

leave to ﬁle an

amended

which “the court may order the application dismissed or grant

application or, direct that the proceedings otherwise continue.

Disposition on the pleadings and record

However, upon a motion “by

is

not proper if there exists a material issue of fact?”

either party” brought pursuant to subsection (c)

the dismissal protocol permits

on the record, there

is

18

‘9

:°

§ 19—4906,

summary disposition of the petition without a hearing when, based

no genuine

issue

Of material

fact,

judgment as a matter of law.” Additionally, where the

17

of IC

and the moving party
state requests

is entitled to

summary

disposition under

Id
Id.

1d. at

272, 61 P.2d at 629.

IDAHO CODE ANN.

§

19-49omx2017).

l

Id.
22

summary disposition of the application when it
admissions and agreements of fact, together
and
appears ﬁom the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
with any aﬁ‘ldavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
IC

§ 19-4906(c).

The court may grant a motion by

either party for

l'udﬂent as a matter of law.

ORDER DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Sanders

v.

Page 6

State

Case No. CV-2O l 7-283 7-PC

Page 54

subsection (c) and the motion provides sufﬁcient notice of the grounds for dismissal, the court

is

not obligated to provide the petitioner with 20 days to respond to a proposed dismissal.” “The
subsection (c) motion itself serves as notice that

However, “[w]here the
the application

on grounds

own initiative and the
where the

may

still

state

state

summary dismissal

has ﬁled a motion for

different

summary

is

being sought.

3’24
.

.

disposition, but the court dismisses

ﬁom those asserted in the state’s motion, it does so on its

court must provide twenty days notice?” Furthermore, even in cases

does not controvert the petitioner’s

be appropriate because “the court

is

facts,

summary

dismissal of an application

not required to accept either the applicant’s mere

conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of

law

”26

Thus, a petition

is still

“subj ect to

summary

dismissal if the petitioner has not presented

evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the
applicant bears the burden of proof?”

Summary dismissal under the UPCPA
summary judgment.

28

is

the procedural equivalent of a motion for

Therefore, courts utilize the

summary judgnent standard when deciding

whether to dismiss a petition for post~conviction relief.” The summary judgment standard
requires

23

kuhamchone v.

day notice
24
25

26
27
28
29

a court

is

to

View the

State,

facts in a light

most favorable

to the petitioner

and determine

127 Idaho 3 19, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995)(intema1 citations omittedmmo twentywhen the court yams a motion for summary disposition”).

required under subsection (c)

Id.(intemal citation omitted).
Id. (internal citation omitted).

Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.2d at 629.
Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at 604, 21 P.2d at 926.
Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741 P.2d 374 (Idaho

Ct.

App. 1987).

Id
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whether those

ﬁnds

the court

facts, if accepted as true,

would

entitle the petitioner to post-conviction relief.” If

that the accepted facts entitle the petitioner to relief, the court

cvidentiary hearing.3

l

If there is

no genuine

dismissal.” Therefore, to withstand

must present his supporting

summary

facts in the

an evidentiary hearing.”33 “That

is,

0f material

issue

must conduct an

fact, the petition is subj ect to

dismissal, “an applicant for post-conviction relief

form of competent evidence

that

would be admissible

at

an application ‘must be supported by written statements

ﬁom witnesses who are able to give testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge, or
must be based upon otherwise veriﬁable information?“ As
“[a]

mere

scintilla

of evidence or only

slight

doubt

is

in a

motion

for

summary judgnent,

not sufficient to create a genuine issue of

material fact?” Courts “do not give evidentiary value to

mere conclusory allegations

that are

unsupported by admissible evidence?”

The

appellate court “exercises

material fact exists?” Therefore,

ﬁee review

. . .

in determining whether a genuine issue of

upon appeal from a summary

dismissal, the issue is whether

the petition raises any facts which, if found to be true, entitle the applicant to relief.” “[ij the

facts alleged, taken as true,

would not

entitle the petitioner to relief,

it is

not error to dismiss the

uncontroverted petition?”

3°
3‘

Farrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 798, 25 P.3d 110, 111 (2001).
LePage, 138 Idaho at 806-07, 69 P.3d at 1067-68.
Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 881, 187 P.3d 1253, 1256 (Idaho

Ct.

App. 2008)

(internal citations omitted).

2:

1d.
34
35

36
37
38

39

Id.(qu0ting

Drapeau v.

State,

103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (Idaho Ct.App.l982)).

Id. (internal citation omitted).

Id.(intema1 citations omitted).
Nellsch, 122 Idaho at 429-304, 835 P.2d at 665-66.

Noel

v.

State, 113 Idaho 92, 94, 741 P.2d 728,

730 (Idaho

Ct.

App. 1987).

[(1.5 internal citation omitted}
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b.

Analysis

The

basis of the Petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief is the ineffective assistance

of counsel. “In order

to establish a violation

assistance of counsel, the defendant

prejudice?“ The

of the constitutional guarantee to effective

must show both deﬁcient performance and resulting

test for evaluating

whether a criminal defendant has received the effective

assistance of counsel is two-pronged and requires that the petitioner establish:
(1) counsel’s

conduct was deﬁcient because
petitioner

was prejudiced

it fell

outside the

wide range ofprofessional norms; and

as a result of the deﬁcient conduct.“ “Facts presented

(2) the

must be

in the

form of competent, admissible evidence. Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by
speciﬁc facts, do not suffice to show ineffectiveness of counsel?”
In assessing the reasonableness of attorney performance,

rendered adequate assistance and
professional judgment.“

As

made

all

it is

presumed that counsel

signiﬁcant decisions in the exercise ofreasonable

such, strategic

and tactical decisions

will not

be second guessed or

serve as a basis for post—conviction relief under a claim of ineﬂ‘ective assistance of counsel

unless the decision

is

shown to have

resulted

from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the

relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of obj ective review.“ Further, to satisfy the

prejudice prong of the

4°

test,

the applicant

must establish there

is

a reasonable probability

that,

883 P.2d 714, 717 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994) (internal citations omitted).
134 Idaho 581, 584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000); Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 101, 982 P.2d 931, 936
(1999) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).
‘2
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d s98, 903 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994xintema1 citations omitted).
43
Pratt, 134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834; State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300, 306-07, 986 P.2d 323, 329-30 (1999)
‘1

State, 126 Idaho 356, 359,

Beasley

v.

Pratt

State,

v.

(citing Strickland v.
“4

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984)).
at 834; Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994), cert denied

134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d
513 U.S. 1130 1995).
Pratt,

g
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absent counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.“

The applicant must show the

attorney’s deﬁcient conduct ‘so

functioning of the adversarial process that the

result?“ Because the applicant must

tn'al

cannot be relied on as having produced ajust

show actual unreasonable performance by trial counsel and

actual prejudice, “dismissal is proper if the applicant fails to

The United

States

undermined the proper

Supreme Court has

meet his burden under

either

part?"

further described the following considerations that

should guide a court’s determination as to whether counsel rendered deﬁcient performance.
Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance

must be highly

deferential.

It is all

too

tempting for a defendant to second—guess counsel’s assistance aﬁer conviction or adverse
sentence, and

it is all

too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after

unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel

it

has proved

was unreasonable.

A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate
of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.
Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under
the

distorting

effects

the circumstances, the challenged action “mi

There are countless ways

t

be considered sound

to provide effective assistance in

trial

strategy.”

any given case. Even the best

criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.

The

availability

detailed guidelines for

of intrusive

its

evaluation

post—trial inquiry into attorney

would encourage

performance or of

the proliferation of ineffectiveness

challenges. Criminal tn'als resolved unfavorably to the defendant

would

increasingly

be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel’s unsuccessful defense.
Counsel’s performance and even willingness to serve could be adversely affected.

come

t0

Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could

45

Milburn

Fox v.

v.

State,

135 Idaho 701, 706, 23 P.3d 775, 780 (Idaho Ct.App. 2000)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S.
873 P.2d 926, 928 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994).

at 694);

State, 125 Idaho 672, 674,

46

Milburn, 135 Idaho at 706, 23 P.3d at 780 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).
Fox, 125 Idaho at 674, 873 P.2d at 928; Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903 (“To avoid summary dismissal,
a post-conviction claim of ineﬁ‘ective assistance of counsel must sufﬁciently allege facts under both prongs of the

47

test”).
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dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the
acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client.4
Those guiding principles are

particularly relevant to the application submitted here,

and

consequently must take precedence in the analysis of the claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel raised by the Petitioner. A11 legitimate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are set
forth below.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

Conﬂict of Interest

a.

The primary complaint raised by the

Petitioner in support of post-conviction relief is the

alleged conﬂict of interest within the public defender’s oﬁice regarding his criminal case. In his

veriﬁed Petition for Post—Conviction relief prepared pro-se, the Petitioner asserted the following:

“There was a conﬂict of interest where Riley Fry should not have been allowed to represent
to begin with.

Dave Martinez could not represent me due to conﬂict

ofﬁce?” The majon'ty of the Objection to

State’s

[and] they are in

same

me
[sic]

Motion for Summary Dismissal, prepared by

appointed counsel, was also devoted to that alleged conﬂict of interest. Speciﬁcally, the
Petitioner argued the “unrefuted claim” that a conﬂict of interest existed within the public

defender’s ofﬁce “provides the clear basis for deﬁciencies regarding the Public Defender’s ofﬁce

continuing to represent [the Petitioner] even aﬁer the conﬂict

“An accused has the right under both the federal and

‘3

was discovered?”

state constitutions to representation

Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396, 410, 327 P.3d 372, 386 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013xquoting Strickland, 466 U.s.
689-90, 104 S.Ct. at 2065—66, so L.Ed.2d at 694—95 (citations omitted».
49
Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 2.
5°

Obj. to State’s Mot. for

Summ.

Dismissal at

1.
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ﬁee from conﬂicts of interest?“ “This
of the eﬁ'ect

it

right has

been accorded not for

has on the ability of the accused to receive a

courts necessarily rely in large measure

upon the good

fair

faith

its

own sake but because

trial?” However, because

“trial

and good judgment of defense

counsel”, a reviewing court cannot presume the possibility for conﬂict resulted in ineffective
assistance of counsel.53 Thus, in a post—conviction case alleging conﬂict of interest

defendant raised no obj ection to the alleged conﬂict at

trial,

where a

the petitioner bears the burden to

demonstrate not only an actual conﬂict, but also that the conﬂict adversely affected the adequacy

of his representation.“ ‘Actual conﬂict of interest

may be shown,

for example, if the defendant

identiﬁes with particularity alternative defenses or additional important evidence that should

have been presented by counsel?” Prejudice to a criminal defendant

is

presumed “only

if the

defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively represented competing interests’ and that ‘an
actual conﬂict of interest adversely aﬂ‘ected his lawyer’s performance.’”56. Thus, “until a

defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conﬂicting

interests,

he has not established

the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance?” Further, in addition to

“showing an active representation of competing

51

Eddington

v.

Stare, 162 Idaho 812, 819,

interests”, the Petitioner

405 P.3d 597, 604 (Idaho

Ct.

must

also establish

App. 2017xciting State

v.

Guzman, 126

Idaho 368, 371, 883 P.2d 726, 729 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994)).
52
Making Mickens v. Taylor, 535 us. 162, 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1240—41, 152 L.Ed.2d 291, 300-01 (2002)).
53
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 445 us. 335, 347, 100 s. Ct. 1708, 1717, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980).
5‘

Eddington, 162 Idaho

at 819,

100 S.Ct. at 1718 (1n order to
at 604; see also Cuyler, 446 U.s. at 34849
Amendment, a defendant must show that an actual conﬂict of interest adversely

405 P.3d

establish a violation ofthe Sixth

,

affected his lawyer’s performance.)
55

Eddington, 162 Idaho

at 819,

405 P.3d

at

604 (quoting Giles

v,

State, 125 Idaho 921, 923,

877 P.2d 365, 367

(1994)).
5‘

Burger

v.

Kemp, 483 U.s. 776,

U.s. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80
57

Cgler, 446 U.s.

at 350,

100

783, 107 S.Ct. 31 14, 3 120, 97 L.Ed.2d 638, 650 (1987) (quoting Strickland, 466

L.Edzd at 696).

s. Cc. at

1719 Simemal

citation omitted).
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“that

an actual conﬂict adversely affected counsel’s performance?”

“To determine whether an actual conﬂict of interest

exists,

Idaho Courts look to the

standards set forth in the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.”59 According to Rule 1.7, “a

lawyer shall not represent a client

if the representation involves

a concurrent conﬂict of

interest?” In turn, a concurrent conﬂict of interest exists if “the representation of one client will

be directly adverse to another client” or

if “there is

a significant risk that the representation of

one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyers responsibilities to another

client,

a

former client or a third person or by the personal interests of the lawyer, including family and
domestic relationships?“ Under Rule 1.10, a lawyer’s concurrent conﬂicts of interest are

imputed to his or her entire ﬁrm. However, the courts have drawn a distinction between private

law ﬁrms and public defender’s ofﬁces and have “declined

to

impute one public defender’s

conﬂict to the entire ofﬁce.”62 That policy developed because “the potential for conﬂict that
exists in representation

by members of a private ﬁrm does not

exist with multiple representation

by public defenders.”53 As explained by the Idaho Court 0f Appeals,
representations, “there exists

of the

58

State

ﬁrm and there

is

Wood, 132 Idaho
55 L.Ed.2d 426

v.

S.Ct. 1173,
59

6°

State

v.

economic

interest that

each individual attomey shares in the

an image of unseemliness in permitting one lawyer

88, 98,

of multiple private

in cases

to

clients

perform tasks that

967 P.2d 702, 712 (1998)(citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482, 98

(1978)).

severson, 147 Idaho 694, 705, 215 P.3d 414, 425 (2009) (internal citation omitted).

Idaho R. Prof. Conduct

1.7.

6'

1d.
62

Severson, 147 Idaho at 706, 215 P.3d at 426; see also State

v.

Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 794, 171 P.3d 1282, 1292

(Idaho Ct.App.2007).

Cook, 144 Idaho at 793, 17 1 P.3d at 1291(citing State v. Bell, 90 NJ. 163, 447 A.2d 525 (1982))(ﬁnding no
conﬂict of interest in a case where co—defendants were both re resented b the uublic defendcr’s ofﬁce).

63
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his partner cannot.

3’64
.

.

However, “[b]ecause

‘the primary, if not the only, responsibility

of an

we

assistant public defender is to represent individual citizens in controversy with the State’

can expect the public defenders to withdraw from the case whenever joint representation

may

prejudice their clients?“ Thus, while “the subtle inﬂuences that arise from public defenders
practicing side

by side in the same ofﬁce may present

diﬁ'lculties in

maintaining absolute

independence,” Idaho couns ultimately agreed that ‘the inbred adversary tendencies of [public
defense] lawyers are sufﬁcient protection.“
establishing a “per se rule requiring counsel

many defendants of competent

local public

The Idaho Court of Appeals
from separate oﬂices would

further concurred that

needlessly deprive

defenders?“ Therefore, conﬂicts within a public

defender’s ofﬁce are analyzed on a case-by-case basis, which “permits ﬂexibility and ensures
that indigent defendants receive adequate representation?“

defendants

who would otherwise be prejudiced by a public defender’s

such cases, “the relevant inquiry
interest

Such a framework

and a

is

also “protects

conﬂict of interest?“ In

whether the circumstances demonstrate a potential conﬂict of

signiﬁcant likelihood of prej udice.”70 If both circumstances are present, then

“there is a presumption that both an actual conﬂict 0f interest and actual prej udice will arise?“

The

alleged conﬂict in this case

criminal case and a witness “importan

64

”

to his defense.

representation of the Petitioner in his

The Petitioner argued there was a “plain

Id.(intemal citation omitted).

65

Id.

(quoting State

v.

Bell,

Id.

(quoting State

v.

Bell,

66
67

was the concurrent

90 NJ.
9O NJ.

163,
163,

447 A.2d 525, 528(citations omitted))(l982).
447 A.2d 525, 528(citations omitted))(l982).

Id. (internal citation omitted).

Severson, 147 Idaho at 707, 215 P.3d at 426.
Z:

1d.
7°
71

Id. at 706,

215 P.3d

1d.(internal

at

426

(internal quotations omitted).

notations omitted

.
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conﬂict of interest provid[ing] a clear basis for ineﬁ‘ective assistance” based on a violation of
“the Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9.”72

The

Petitioner elaborated

on the alleged

conﬂict in his amended afﬁdavit, explaining that Randy Schulthies of the Public Defender’s

Ofﬁce was the ﬁrst attorney assigned to represent him. The
“agreed” to have
Schulthies

Dave

Martinez, another public defender, take over his case because Mr.

“was too busy.

“would not bring any

Petitioner stated that he later

3’73
.

The

Petitioner also testiﬁed that

‘ineffective assistance

he signed a

letter stating

he

of counsel’ complaints” based on Mr. Martinez

taking over the case.” However, as the Petitioner’s case proceeded, Rylie Fry, another public

defender in the same ofﬁce, took over representation. The Petitioner testiﬁed that change was
necessary because “Dave Martinez told

me he could not represent me because he had a conﬂict

and represented a person who was an important witness

in

my case?”

information, the Petitioner agreed to have Mr. Fry take over his case.

was comfortable with Mr. Fry
office

substituting in as counsel “because

would be prepared and he would do a good job.”76 The

Based on that

The

Petitioner averred he

Dave and Randy

Petitioner further testiﬁed that

aﬁer he informed Mr. Fry about the witness that created the conﬂict, Mr. Fry stated
‘not be a problem’

and he would be able

to call

73

Obj. to State’s Mot. for

Am.

Summ.

Dismissal at

it

“would

any witnesses” necessary to the case.” The

Petitioner also stated that he “discussed” the potential conﬂict with

72

said their

Mr. Schulthies, Mr.

1.

Afr. ofPet’r, 1:2, Dec. 19, 2017.

74

Id.
75

76

1d. at 1:2-2.

Id. at 1:2-2.

77

1d.
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Martinez, and Mr. Fry, and Mr. Fry

was aware of the witness and the Petitioner’s thoughts

regarding the importance of that witness to the defense."

Because the Petitioner did not obj ect to the alleged conﬂict

at tn'al, the Petitioner bears

the burden to demonstrate an actual conhict and that such conﬂict adversely affected his

lawyer’s performance. Conﬂicts of interest within a public defender’s office are not
automatically imputed to the entire ofﬁce, but are analyzed

expectation that the public defenders will “withdraw

basis,

with an

ﬁom the case whenever joint representation

may prejudice their clients?” The conﬂict alleged here
Petitioner in his criminal case

on a case-by-case

is

”
and a witness “importan

the concurrent representation of the

to his defense.

A potential conﬂict

might arise from the concurrent representation of a prosecution witness and a defendant, or a
defendant in one case and another party in an unrelated case where the other party

is

a witness.”

“[R]epresentation of the inevitably disparate interests of prosecution witnesses and a defendant
threatens the Sixth

Amendment’s guarantee of counsel,

[and]

would

create a conﬂict of

interest?“ However, the Petitioner did not claim that the “important” witness represented by the

same public defender’s ofﬁce was on the opposite

side of the issue of the Petitioner’s culpability,

nor was the Petitioner’s afﬁdavit describing the conﬂict enough to determine conclusively

whether a concurrent conﬂict of interest even existed here. While the Petitioner made allegations
that certain evidence

78

see

and information “was never sought or obtained”82, including, for example,

id. at 3:4.

79

Cook, 144 Idaho at 793, 171 P.3d at 1291.
3°
See id.
8‘
1d. at 792, 171 P.3d at 1290.
82

Am.

Aﬁ‘. of Pet’r at 3:5; see also Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 2-3.
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additional video evidence

and police

reports, the Petitioner did not identify

“with particularity”

any actual conﬂict of interest.” Neither did the Petitioner connect his counsel’s perceived
shortcomings to the alleged conﬂict of interest stemming from another public defender’s
concurrent representation of a witness the Petitioner believed was important to his case.

Moreover, the record does not support the allegation that Mr. Fry actively represented conﬂicting
interests.

Thus, because “[t]he conﬂict must be shown and will not be presumed”, the Petitioner

failed to demonstrate

an actual conﬂict of interest existed due

to

Mr. Martinez’s alleged

representation of “an important witness” in the Petitioner’s case.“

Nonetheless, even assuming for purposes of the two-prong

of interest did

exist, there is still

no evidence

conﬂict was likely to result in prejudice.

Cook analysis

in the record to support the conclusion that

Nor is there any

interest. First, the

he had discussed the conﬂict issue with Mr. Fry and the public defenders

previously assigned to his case.

Aﬁer that

discussion, the Petitioner agreed to continued

representation by the public defender’s ofﬁce, and speciﬁcally agreed to representation

Fry.

any

indication in the record that Mr.

Martinez and Mr. Fry were acting in a manner adverse to the Petitioner’s
Petitioner testiﬁed

that a conﬂict

While the Petitioner

stated his belief that “the Public

Defender oﬁice

[sic]

by Mr.

tﬁed to use

my

agreement to substitute Dave Martinez to cover the fact they would have an unprepared attorney

d0 the

“3

‘4

tria ”, there is

no evidence

See Eddington, 162 Idaho

Am.

at 819,

his representation

405 P.3d

was “corrupted by conﬂicting

interests” or

at 604.

Afr. ofPet’r at 1:2—2.
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that his counsel “actively represented

competing interests?“ Similarly, the record does not

suggest that counsel failed to call certain witnesses or pursue certain discovery because of any

conﬂict of interest. Additionally,

it is

important to note that Mr. Fry was not the only attorney

representing the Petitioner, as Kent Reynolds

was serving

as co-counsel throughout the trial.“

There has been no allegation that Mr. Reynolds was operating under a conﬂict of interest, and
the “presence of co-counsel further diminishe[s] any likelihood of prejudice.

no evidence or even contention as

to

how the

lawyer’s performance.“ For example, there

a problem’ and he would be able to

is

There

is also

no evidence Mr. Fry and Mr. Martinez ever
fact, the Petitioner

that created the conﬂict,

call

.

alleged conﬂict of interest adversely affected the

shared information adverse to the Petitioner’s interests. In

he informed Mr. Fry about the witness

3’87
.

testiﬁed that aﬁer

Mr. Fry stated

it

“would

‘not be

any Witnesses” necessary to the case.”

In sum, the record ﬁrst does not support the Petitioner’s allegation that his attorney
“actively represented competing interests.”

the Petitioner

resulting

still

failed to

86
‘7
38

89

existed,

meet his burden of showing a signiﬁcant likelihood of prejudice

from such conﬂict. Therefore, the

sufﬁcient to warrant post-conviction

85

However, even assuming an actual conﬂict

Petitioner’s assertion

of a conﬂict of interest

is

not

relief.

Burger, 483 U.s. at 733, 107 S.Ct. at 3 120.
Am. Aff. ofPet’r at 2:3.

See.

Severson, 147 Idaho at 707, 215 P.3d at 427.

See

Am.

id.

Aff.

of Pet’r

at 122-2.
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b.

Legal Strategies

As accompanying grounds

for post-conviction relief, the Petitioner also pointed to several

alleged deﬁciencies in his counsel’s performance before, during, and aﬁer the
the Petitioner stated his counsel

was

ineﬁ‘ective because

preparation”, and “lack of knowledge about the case.”9°

trial.

In particular,

of “poor communication”, “lack of

The

Petitioner

made

other similarly

imprecise accusations, including the alleged failure to pursue discovery of video and other
possible evidence, and the fact that no defense witnesses were called at

tn'al.

For example, the

veriﬁed Petition stated: “There was an edited video that only showed me, did not show female
that

was

in [id] store with

blonde female

who

I

me but more importantly didn’t show my witness along with the

believed

was owner of card

”9‘
[id].

The

Petitioner also claimed “there

information not available to the Defense such as other video out there, seperate

on the

theft [and] use

was

ineﬁ‘ective because “[n]o witnesses

were called on

no defense was presented?” In his Objection to

Summary Dismissal, the

Petitioner claimed the “allegations of errors

State’s

[the

Motion

9°

for

and omissions before,

during and aﬁer trial present aprimafacz'e case of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Petitioner stated he

done

[sic] report

of the same credit card done by Detective Phillips?” The Petitioner

further alleged his counsel

Petitioner’s] behalf,

was

3’94
.

.

The

had “provided numerous speciﬁc factual allegations about counsel’s deﬁcient

Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 2.

91

92

1d.
93

1d.
9‘

Obi. to State’s Mot. for

Summ.

Dismissal at 2.
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performance before, during and aﬁer trial which are likewise unreﬁned?”
allegations, the Petitioner claimed

he heard co—counsel

at his trial “tell” his attorney “to object

several times to questions and evidence”, but his attorney did not object.96

complained that when he decided to
provided him so

I

could

tell

testify, his attorney

all

the other

[the Petitioner]

The

Petitioner also

“did not ask the questions

I

had

my side of the story.”97 The Petitioner additionally averred that

counsel “allowed highly prejudicial evidence in

FTC, when

Among those

at trial like all the other illegal

was only accused of using

it

at

charges on the

Fred Meyer, not going on a spree with

uses?”

A careful review of the petition, obj ection, and amended afﬁdavit regarding the
Petitioner’s

most discernible

allegations

allegations are bare and conclusory.

of ineffective assistance as described above, prove those

To withstand summary

dismissal, “an applicant for post—

conviction relief must present his supporting facts in the form of competent evidence that would

be admissible

at

an evidentiary hearing?” “That

written statements from witnesses

their

who are able to

is,

an application ‘must be supported by

give testimony themselves as to facts within

knowledge, or must be based upon otherwise veriﬁable information.’”1°0 The Petitioner did

not meet that burden here, and courts do not give evidentiary value to mere conclusory
allegations unsupported

conduct

95

96

by admissible evidence. The

“fell outside the

Petitioner has failed to

wide range of professional norms”, and he has

show his counsel’s

failed to

show any

Pet. for Post—Conviction Relief at 1.

Am.

Aff. ofPet’r at 2:3.

97

Id.
9“

1d.
99

Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 881, 187 P.3d at 1256.

"’0

1d.(guoting

Draeeau

v.

Stare,

103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 gdaho Ct.AE£.1982)2.
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resulting prejudice. Nevertheless, in the interest ofjudicial diligence, a thorough analysis of the
Petitioner’s

most deﬁned claims

related to his counsel’s alleged inadequate legal strategies

follows.

Failure to Object

As

explained previously, counsel’s strategic and tactical decisions will not be second

guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineﬂ'ective assistance of
counsel unless the decision

is

shown

to

have resulted ﬁ‘om inadequate preparation, ignorance of

the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Trial counsel’s lack of

obj ection to testimony

decisionswl

As such,

and the manner of cross—examination are tactical, or
the decision not to obj ect in the Petitioner’s case

strategic,

“may not be second-

guessed unless [the Petitioner] presents evidence indicating that the decision was based on
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of obj ective

evaluation?!” Similarly, when a petitioner alleges counsel failed to obj ect to erroneous jury
instructions or to request proper jury instructions, the petitioner

instructions.1°3

must

identify the

ﬂawed

Moreover, “[e]ffective legal representation does not require that an attorney

object to admissible evidence.”m4 “Indeed, if evidence is arguably admissible, and the

could have properly allowed the evidence even

”’1

“’2
103
“’4

if counsel

trial

court

had objected, the counsel’s

Cook, 157 Idaho at 778, 339 P.3d at 1182; Eddington, 162 Idaho at 821, 405 P.3d at 606.
Cook, 157 Idaho at 77s, 339 P.3d at 1182 (imemal citation omitted).
See State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 529, 348 P.3d 1, 144 (2015).
Cook, 157 Idaho at 778, 339 P.3d at 1182 (citing State v. Aspeytia, 13o Idaho 12, 15, 936 P.2d 210, 213 (Idaho

CLAE. 1 997 g).
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performance generally will not be obj ectively deﬁcient?” Therefore, “the standard for
deﬁcient performance

when dealing with a failure to

obj ect is not whether the testimony could

have been excluded, but whether the testimony could have been properly admitted.”
that standard, “[ﬂailing to object to arguably inadmissible testimony will generally

insufﬁcient to overcome the presumption that the decision

was based on sound

106

Based on

be

legal strategy.”1°7

Correspondingly, “If the testimony could not have been properly admitted, then

it

can be

reasonably inferred, absent evidence to the contrary, that the attorney’s failure to object was the

product of ignorance of the relevant law governing admissibility of the testimony?!” Hence, in

reviewing whether “counsel’s failure to obj ect

fell

below an objectively reasonable standard of

performance, [the court] must ﬁrst determine whether the testimony could have properly been
admitted without error by the

While the

Petitioner

trial court.”1°9

made the conclusory

allegation of “lack of preparation”, the

Petitioner did not present evidence that any failure to obj ect

shortcoming capable of objective evaluation.

was

actually based

“It is well established that

on some

an appellant bears the

burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the
claims of error, and where pertinent portions ofthe record are missing on appeal, they are

presumed

to support the actions

of the

trial

court.”“°

Even the marginally more speciﬁc

complaints regarding his attorney’s failure to obj ect were unsupported by evidence or citation to

‘05

1“
‘07
“’8

”9
11°

Id. (internal citation omitted).
1d. (internal citation omitted).
Id. (internal citation omitted).

1d. at
1d. at

State

778-79, 339 P.3d at 1182-83 (internal citations omitted).
770, 339 P.3d at 1183 (internal citations omitted).
Regici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Idaho Ct.

v.
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The

the record.

Petitioner did not provide

strategic decisions,

object

were the

attorney

any context by which to evaluate the challenged

nor did the Petitioner oﬁ'er speciﬁc evidence or argument that the failures to

result

of discernible inadequacy. There

is

was ignorant of the law or inadequately prepared

no evidence in the record

that the

in relation to obj ections at tn'al.

Further, while failure to obj ect to allegedly inadmissible evidence meets the standard for

deﬁcient performance, the Petitioner offered nothing by which to evaluate whether his counsel
failed to challenge evidence that

was

inadmissible. While the Petitioner mentioned

some

speciﬁc examples of evidence or testimony he thought his attorney should have obj ected
Petitioner did not

to,

the

oﬁer any evidence by which to evaluate whether the challenged evidence or

testimony could have been properly admitted without error by the
decision not to object perhaps reﬂected a conscious

trial

trial court.

strategy to avoid

In this case, the

ﬁequent overruling by

the judge and annoyance ofthe jury.m Likewise, in relation to his claim that his attorney failed

to object to

a jury instruction regarding

illegal activity outside

did not attach the jury instructions used at

judge that claim}
to obj ect to

12

trial

or offer any other related evidence

”2
”3

Am.

failure

a jury instruction was the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or
113

The

Petitioner simply has not

Higgins, 122 Idaho 59o, 60243, 836 P.2d 536, 548—49 (1992).
ocht’r at 5:13.
See Storm v. State, 112 Idaho 71s, 722, 735 P.2d 1029, 1033 (1987) (agreeing with a district

See State

by which to

That lack of evidence prohibits an evaluation of whether the alleged

some other incompetence capable of obj ective review.

1”

of Bannock County, the Petitioner

shown a

v.

Afr.

court’s rejection of

of failure to object to allegedly inadmissible
statements because there was no allegation or evidence that the attorney was ignorant of the law or inadequately
prepared concerning the issue).

allegations of incﬂ‘ective assistance of trial counsel as a result
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reasonable probability that the outcome of his case would have been diﬂ‘erent had his attorney
raised the complained-of obj ections, nor has the Petitioner presented the evidence necessary to

overcome the highly

deferential judicial scrutiny that

must be aﬁ‘orded

to his counsel’s

performance.
Failure to Call Witnesses

The

Petitioner also alleged counsel

Petitioner “asked

him to”

call at

was deﬁcient because he “did not call witnesses” the

triaLm Like decisions to

particular witness is a strategic or tactical decision”,

object, “the decision

which

on appeal.”5 Therefore, decisions about which witnesses

ordinarily will not

whether to

call a

be second-guessed

to call will not “serve as a basis for

post-conviction relief under an alleged claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless that
decision

is

shown to have

resulted

from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or

other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation?”

16

Again, the Petitioner failed to provide any basis for an objective evaluation regarding his
attorney’s decision whether to call witnesses.

The

Petitioner presented nothing to give rise to a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether his counsel’s performance

fell

outside the wide range

of professional norms. While the Petitioner made general allegations regarding witnesses he
asked to be called at

trial

and offered the names of certain Witnesses he believed should have

been subpoenaed, the Petitioner did not provide an adequate record upon which to review the
merits of the claimed errors. “[W]here pertinent portions of the record are missing
“4

Am.

on appeal,

Afr. ofPet’r at 2:3.

“5

Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 258, 869 P.2d 571, 575 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994); see also Eddington
at 821, 405 P.3d at 606.
”6
Gabourie, 125 Idaho at 258, 869 P.2d at 575.
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they are presumed to support the actions of the

trial

court”! 17 The Petitioner did not provide

“actual evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or shortcomings capable

of objective evaluation” in relation to his counsel’s decision not to
such, the court

is

unable to evaluate counsel’s choice not to

call

call

witnesses at trial.”

As

witnesses to the stand and

whether that strategic decision amounted to ineffective assistance. Therefore, the alleged error to
call

witnesses at trial

is

not sufﬁcient for post-conviction

relief.

Failure to Discover and Present Evidence

As described previously,
failure

of his attorney

made

the Petitioner

to discover

additional claims regarding the alleged

and investigate evidence, such as counsel’s alleged

failure to

pursue “discovery of information” regarding police reports, certain video evidence, and the
failure to

“Ping” the Petitioner’s

cell

phone

to

show his

location at certain times supposedly

relevant to the charges ﬁled against him.“9

“Detennining whether an attorney’s

pretn’al preparation falls

performance constitutes a question of law, but

is

below a

essentially premised

level

of reasonable

upon the circumstances

surrounding the attorney’s investigation.”12° The court “will not second—guess

tn'al

counsel in

the particularities of trial preparation.”121 That standard exists because there is a strong

presumption that counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made

”7
”8
”9
'2“

Eddington, 162 Idaho at 821, 405 P.3d

at

606

all

signiﬁcant decisions in the

(internal citation omitted).

Id.

See

e.g.

Am.

Aff. ofPet’r at 3:54:10.

156 Idaho 396, 412, 327
m Id: internal citation
omitted).
Stevens

v.

State,

P.3d 372, 388 (Idaho
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exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”m

counsel conduct a reasonable investigation.”123

“The duty

To

investigation, the court “consider[s] not only the

to investigate requires only that

assess the reasonableness of the

quantum of evidence known to counsel, but

also

whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.”m
“Strategic choices

made

after

thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible

options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices

made aﬁer less

than complete

investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments

support the limitations on investigation.”125 Further, “the fact that counsel could have discovered
helpful evidence that

may have been persuasive at trial is not the

must examine the steps counsel did take
counsel’s conduct

norms so as
eﬂ‘ort to

by way of an

standard.”126 Rather, the court

in investigating the issue.

127

The court must “assess

objective review of reasonableness under prevailing professional

to eliminate the distorting effects ofhjndsight.”128 Courts

“must also make every

avoid a post hoc rationalization of the attomey’s conduct?!”

As explained

in detail previously, “in order to prevail

on a claim of ineffective

assistance

of counsel, a petitioner must show his counsel’s performance was obj ectively deﬁcient and

that,

but for the attorney’s deﬁcient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been

m waiting Strickland, 466 us. at 69o, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, so L.Ed.2d at 695; Stare

v.

Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,

3mm, 986 P.2d 323, 329—30 (1999)).

m

Id. (internal citations omitted).

‘2‘

Id. at

412-13, 327 P.3d at 388-89(intema1 citations omitted).
413, 327 P.3d at 339 (citing Stricklanaa 466 U.s. at 690—91, 104 S.Ct. at 2065—66, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695—96).

1d. at

419, 327 P.3d at 395.

1d. at
‘25

‘26
127
‘28

”9

1d.
1d. at

412, 327 P.3d at 388 (internal citations omitted).

Id. (intemal citations

omitted

.
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different.”l3° Additionally, as referenced above, a determination
as to

pretn'al preparation fell

below a

level

whether an attorney’s

of reasonableness depends on the circumstances

surrounding the attorney’s investigation. In this matter, the Petitioner only

made conclusory

allegations regarding his counsel’s alleged failure to investigate. For example, in his

amended

afﬁdavit, the Petitioner claimed his defense counsel “did not pursue discovery of information
reports Katie

investigated

reports

Denny had made of use of her FTC

by the Blackfoot police.

“would have been evidence

Petitioner, “This information

[sic]”l3

1

to dispute

at Riverside Idaho

The

on

which were being

Petitioner further stated he “believed” those

my criminal charge.”m

According to the

was never sought or obtained.”l33 However, such

allegations are

unsupported by any sort of evidence by which to evaluate whether the claimed “undiscovered”
evidence was actually overlooked and whether such evidence was even relevant. Other
allegations regarding undiscovered evidence

made by the

Petitioner

were similarly unclear and

imprecise. For example, the Petitioner complained about his attorney’s failure to discover a

Video taken at a McDonald’s restaurant that he “believe[d]” existed. The Petitioner explained
this alleged

video was important because

it

“showed Roman Hamman, Katie Denny and

together in the car. Katie used the card to buy us food. This

no witnesses to

this

use of the

me

was never sought or obtained, and

FTC were called.”134 However, beyond those bare assertions, the

Petitioner did not present actual evidence to permit an evaluation of whether the failure to

‘30

1d.(citing Strickland,

466 us.

m Am. Aﬂ‘. ofPet‘r at 3:5.
”2
133

134

at 694,

104 S.Ct.

at

2068, so L.Ed.2d at 697—98).

1d.

Id

Am.

Aff. ofPet’r at 4:7.
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discover this video

was the result of inadequate

preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or

some

other shortcoming capable of objective evaluation necessary to determine whether defense

counsel

failed to

was

ineffective in this regard. Further, the Petitioner did not assert that his counsel

uncover and

utilize the

most relevant information or to pursue the obvious defenses.

Again, the Petitioner “bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate
court can review the merits of the claims of error, and where pertinent portions 0f the record are

missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the
evidence presented by the Petitioner, there
reasonable diligence

was the cause of the

is

tn'al court.”135

Based on the

nothing to show “that a mere lack of obj ectively

failure” to

ﬁnd

and/or utilize the alleged police reports

ﬁom a different county and the claimed video evidence.l36

The

Petitioner has not

shown defense

counsel’s actions in this regard amounted to constitutionally deﬁcient performance.
explained, “just because counsel could have found something helpful, doesn’t

As

mean he

is

deﬁcient for not having found that information.”l37 Thus, the attorney’s failures as alleged by
the Petitioner do not constitute deﬁcient performance sufﬁcient for a ﬁnding “that counsel’s

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversan'al process that the
relied

on

regard

“5
‘35

137
‘38

trial

cannot be

as having produced a just result”‘38, and his claim of ineffective assistance in this

fails.

Repici, 122 Idaho ax 541, 835 P.2d at 1352 (internal citations omitted).

See Stevens, 156 Idaho

at

414, 327 P.3d at 39o.

1d.
Id. (internal

notation and citations omitted).

Page 28

ORDER DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Sanders v. State
Case No. CV-2017-2837—PC

_

Page 76

Other Claims of Deﬁciencies
In addition to those

more

identiﬁable allegations mentioned above, the Petitioner raised

numerous other conclusory claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, only supported by the
argument that he “has provided numerous speciﬁc factual allegations about counsel’s deﬁcient
performance before, during and
allegations, unsupported

review of the

by

after trial

facts

petition, objection,

which are likewise unrefuted.”139 Such conclusory

and evidence, are

diﬂ'lcult to address fully.

and amended afﬁdavit demonstrate

allegations not previously addressed in detail are also bare

to support

Therefore,

that

However, a careful

any remaining

and conclusory. The Petitioner

failed

such claims with the necessary evidence, rendering any evaluation unfeasible.
it is

suﬁicient to recognize that, upon a thorough review, the remaining allegations do

not satisfy the test for evaluating whether a criminal defendant has received the effective
assistance of counsel.

deﬁcient because

Under that test, the

it fell

petitioner

must

establish: (1) counsel’s

conduct was

outside the wide range of professional norms; and (2) the petitioner

prejudiced because of the deﬁcient

conductm

“Facts presented must be in the form of

competent, admissible evidence. Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by speciﬁc

do not sufﬁce

t0

show ineﬂ'ectiveness of counsel?!“ The

the strategic and tactical decisions

made by his

was

facts,

Petitioner failed to demonstrate that

counsel were the result of inadequate preparation,

ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review or that counsel’s

“9
”0

Obj. to State’s Mot. for

Summ.

Dismissal at

l.

134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834; Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 101, 982 P.2d 93 1, 936 (1999)(citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).
“1
Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903 Simemal citations omitted).
Pratt,
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conduct was outside of the wide range of professional norms. As such, there
second—guess the decisions

made by trial

that,

no basis to

counsel.

Moreover, even assuming the Petitioner could
ineffective assistance, the Petitioner has

is

still

satisfy the ﬁrst

prong of the

test

governing

failed to establish there is a reasonable probability

absent counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been

different.

I42

The applicant must show that the

attorney’s deﬁcient conduct ‘so undermined the

proper functioning of the adversarial process that the

a just

result.’

143

There

is

trial

no evidence of actual prejudice

cannot be relied on as having produced

here. Thus, the Petitioner has not

satisﬁed his burden of demonstrating his counsel’s conduct
the wide range of professional

norms and

that

was deﬁcient because

it fell

outside

he was prejudiced because of any deﬁcient

conduct. Therefore, the remaining claims are also subject to dismissal.
In addition,

it is

advisable to address brieﬂy the Petitioner’s suggestion that the alleged

cumulative effect of his attomey’s deﬁcient performance warrants post-conviction
Idaho courts have recognized the doctn'ne of cumulative
application of the doctrine

alleged

by the

Petitioner

”2

a ﬁnding of error in the ﬁrst

While

“a necessary predicate to

instance.”l44

Because the errors

were not sufﬁcient to constitute defective performance under the law,

the Petitioner has failed to

ineffective assistance

is

error,

relief.

make the necessary showing he

is

entitled to relief on

of counsel claims under the doctrine of cumulative

any of his

error. Additionally, the

23 P.3d at 780 (mtemal citation omitted).
466 U.s. at 686).
‘4‘
Ward v. State, No. 44005, 2017 WL 1046674, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2017xciting Stevens v. State, 156
Idaho 396, 421, 327 P.3d 372, 397 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013)); see also, Adams v. State, 161 Idaho 485, 500, 387 P.3d
“3

Mizbum, 135 Idaho

at 706,

1d.(quoting Strickland,

153, 168 (Idaho Ct. App. 2016), review denied (Jan. 20, 2017).

ohmcomn
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Petitioner’s generalized references to “allegations

after tn'al” that

of errors and omissions before, during and

he claims amount to “a primafacie case of ineﬁ‘ective assistance of counsel””5

are inadequate to support a claim of cumulative error suﬁicient to warrant post—conviction
‘46

relief.

Therefore, the Petitioner has failed to

make a showing of prejudice

regarding any

cumulative effect of his counsel’s conduct, and, the doctrine of cumulative error has no
applicability in this case.

CONCLUSION
As

explained, Idaho

for post-conviction relief.

Code

§

19-4906 permits a court to rule summarily on applications

Based on the State’s answer, motion for summary dismissal, and

supporting brief, the Petitioner had notice of the grounds for
Petitioner

had the opportunity

summary

dismissal and the

to address the

amended

In addition, the

grounds raised by the State through his objection to

affidavit. Therefore,

having found no genuine issue of material

summary dismissal.

based on the preceding analysis and

fact, the Petition for

Post—Conviction Relief is

SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS

SO ORDERED.

DATED this 26‘" day of July, 2018.

MGM}?

ROBERT C. NAFTZ
Distnct Judge

”5

”6

Obj. to State’s Mot. for Summ. Dismissal at 2.
See Ward, No. 44005, 2017 WL 1046674, at *3.

ORDER DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Page 31

Sanders v. State
Case No. CV-ZO 1 7-2837-PC

Page 79

CERTIFICATE 0F MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2Q“: day of July, 201 8, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the manner indicated.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

)U.S. Mail
(X) E-Mail
(

Stephen F. Herzog

BANNOCK COUNTY PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY

Hand Deliver

(

)

(

)Facsimile

624 East Center
Pocatello, ID 83201

APPOINTED COUNSEL

)U.S. Mail
(X) E—Mail
(

Bradley Willis

WILLIS

LAW OFFICES, PLLC

Pocatello,

DATED this gﬂday of

Hand Deliver

(

)

(

)Facsimile

18‘

Avenue
ID 83201

1402 South

July, 2018.

W

Deputy Clerk

ORDER DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Sanders

v.

12mm
\J

Page 32

State

Case No. CV-20 1 7-2837-PC

Page 80

